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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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Defendants and Third-
Party Plaintiffs/ ] 
Respondents, 
vs. 
JOHN A. PETERSON, 
Third-Party Defendant/ 
Appellant. 
I Case No. 860295 
APPELLANTS1 BRIEF 
IDENTITY OF PARTIES 
Appellants are Arleigh P. Linderman (hereinafter 
"Linderman11) and John A. Peterson (hereinafter "Peterson"). 
Linderman and Peterson are sister and brother. Linderman 
purchased six fourplex apartment buildings from Respondents, 
Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M. Walker (hereinafter "Walkers"). 
Peterson acted as Lindermanfs attorney-in-fact throughout the 
transaction. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment signed May 6, 1986 and filed May 7, 1986 
awarding Linderman only $10,505 of approximately $120,000 
claimed against Walkers arising out of breaches of a contract 
for the sale and management of real property. Additional 
damages for fraud, deceit, and conversion were claimed by 
Linderman which were not awarded by the trial court. 
The appeal in this case was filed June 5, 1986. No 
cross-appeal was filed. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Linderman the 
$41,000 which the contract required be paid her upon Walkers' 
failure to refinance within the 90 days provided? 
2. Did the trial court err in denying Lindermanfs 
claim for damages for Walkers' breaches of the contract 
relative to failure to complete the property according to 
plans and specifications, failure to place pro-rated rents and 
deposits into the trust account, failure to manage and pay the 
expense of the property for two years, and taking of personal 
loans from the trust account established to handle funds from 
the property? 
3. Did the trial court err in failing to award 
Linderman all of her attorney fees claimed at trial? 
4. Did the trial court err in not finding that 
Walkers' actions relative to the trust account constituted 
fraud, deceit, and conversion and in thereby denying 
Lindermanfs claim for treble and punitive damages? 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At trial, the trial court was presented a set of 
Stipulated Facts which are by this reference incorporated 
herein (Record at pages 282-289). A copy of the Stipulated 
Facts appears in the Addendum at pages 1-13. Attached to the 
Stipulated Facts are Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-3, the primary 
documents comprising the "contract" between the parties in 
this case. Other documents referred to in the Stipulated 
Facts are not attached as they are too numerous. Those 
documents appear in the record under the same exhibit numbers 
set forth in the Stipulated Facts. 
At trial, the Court heard evidence on Linderman's 
Amended Complaint and on Walkers' Counterclaim, as well as 
evidence in defense of those claims. 
The facts of this case are as follows: 
1. On December 10, 1982 Linderman as buyer and Walkers 
as sellers entered into a written agreement comprised of 
multiple documents (hereinafter "contract") for the purchase 
and sale of six fourplexes (Stipulated Facts, numbered 
paragraph 1; Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-3). 
2. The contract consisted of: (a) Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (two pages) (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1); (b) Addendum 
(two pages) (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2); (c) Escrow Agreement 
(one page) (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3); and (d) an Exhibit "A" 
(descriptions and sketch, three pages) (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
4) (Stipulated Facts, numbered paragraph 2). 
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3. Linderman paid to Walkers a down payment of 
$123,000 (Stipulated Facts, numbered paragraph 4; Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1, page 1, numbered paragraph 3). 
4. Two-thirds of the down payment was paid immediately 
to Walkers, and one-third ($41,000) was placed in escrow 
(Stipulated Facts, numbered paragraph 5, and Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 3, numbered paragraphs 2, 6 and 7). 
5. The contract provided that Walkers obtain certain 
refinancing on two units within 90 days of the signing of the 
contract. In the event the refinancing was not completed 
within the 90 days, the $41,000 was essentially to be paid 
over to Linderman (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, numbered paragraphs 
2, 6 and 7). 
6. The refinancing was not completed within 90 days 
(Stipulated Facts, numbered paragraphs 6-8). On March 22, 
1984, Linderman, through Peterson, mailed a written request to 
the escrow holder. The letter pointed out the passing of the 
90 days and stated: "You are hereby instructed to proceed 
forthwith to execute the instructions of paragraph 8 of the 
addendum to the contract." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 36; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, numbered paragraph 8). 
7. On April 25, 1983, Linderman commenced suit for 
payment of the $41,000 to her (Record, pages 1-3). Due to a 
mixup with previous counsel, Linderman did not respond to a 
motion for summary judgment filed by Walkers. Able to obtain 
an order, Walkers were paid the $41,000 plus accrued interest 
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on or about December 22, 1983. (The order appears at Record, 
pages 44 and 45; evidence of payment appears in Transcript of 
Trial Proceedings [hereinafter "Transcript"], page 260, lines 
23-25; page 261, lines 1-3). The summary judgment order was 
subsequently set aside after a Rule 60(b) motion was brought 
before the Court by Linderman (Record, pages 127-28). 
8. Financing put in place by Walkers after the 90 days 
had expired exceeded by $2,900 the amount allowed by the 
contract (Stipulated Facts, numbered paragraph 9). The trial 
court awarded Linderman the $2,900 (Memorandum Decision, 
numbered paragraph 3(b); Findings of Fact, numbered paragraph 
7(b). A copy of the Memorandum Decision and the Findings of 
Fact appear at Addendum pages 14-17 and pages 18-22 
respectively). Linderman does not appeal the $2,900 awarded 
to her. 
9. The real property sold to Linderman by Walkers was 
not fully completed in accordance with plans and 
specifications as required by the contract (Stipulated Facts, 
numbered paragraph 11). The trial court awarded only $1,000 
of the $2,400 claimed at trial (Memorandum Decision, numbered 
paragraph 3(a); Findings of Fact, numbered paragraph 7(a)). 
10. Though required by the contract, pro-rated rents 
of $2,709.68 and security deposits of $3,725 were never 
transferred by Walkers into a "trust account (10th Avenue 
Townhomes)" (Stipulated Facts, numbered paragraph 12). Though 
a stipulated fact, and a basis of Linderman's claim for 
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damages, no mention is made of this claim in the trial court's 
Memorandum Decision or Findings of Fact. 
11. Sums totaling $7,100 were taken from the 10th 
Avenue Townhomes account for use by Walkers wholly unrelated 
to interests of Linderman and without authorization of any 
kind from Linderman (Stipulated Facts, numbered paragraph 
20). The trial court, in identical language in both its 
Memorandum Decision, numbered paragraph 3(d), and Findings 
of Fact, numbered paragraph 7(d), ruled: 
d. the further claims of plaintiff for damages 
for alleged breach of the management contract by 
the defendant and the withdrawal of monies from 
the property rental account for purposes not 
connected with the property, and the defendant's 
counterclaim against the plaintiff for breach 
of the contract by typing up and withholding the 
$41,000.00 by plaintiff and interference with 
contracts, and for the deposit of defendant's 
personal funds into the property rental account 
result in a net credit to the plaintiff of 
$1,905.00 for a total judgment in favor of 
plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum 
of $9,505.00. 
How the $7,100 was treated by the trial court is not clear. 
12. Under the contract, Walkers were obligated to 
manage the real property for a period of two years from the 
date of sale. If the proceeds from rental of the property 
were not sufficient, Walkers were obligated under the contract 
to pay out of their own pockets all monthly payments due from 
Linderman, all mortgage payments, taxes, insurance, utilities, 
cost of current maintenance, and $250.00 per month into a 
reserve fund (Stipulated Facts, numbered paragraph 21; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, numbered paragraph 3). 
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13. In April, 1984, approximately one and one-half 
years into the two years Walkers were to manage and meet all 
expenses of the property, Linderman, for the first time, 
received notice that the underlying mortgages on the six 
fourplexes were seriously in default, and the 1983 property 
taxes on four of the fourplexes had not been paid when due 
(Transcript, page 271, lines 21-25; page 272, lines 1-13). 
14. In late April, early May 1984, Linderman paid, 
from her own funds: $3,727.72 to the Cache County Recorder 
for past due taxes on four of the fourplexes (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 26); $6,860.40 to United Savings and Loan, in care of 
its attorney, Paul M. Halliday, for past due mortgage payments 
on two of the fourplexes (Plaintiff's Exhibit 24); and 
$7,921.89 to Worthens through Logan Savings and Loan, escrow 
agent for Worthens, for past due mortgage -payments on four of 
the fourplexes (Plaintiff's Exhibit 25). The total paid by 
Linderman at that time was $18,510.01 (see again Transcript, 
page 271, lines 21-25; and page 272, lines 1-13). 
15. Though the trial court awarded Linderman $3,700 
for the 1983 taxes she paid, it is not clear how the trial 
court ruled on the additional $14,782.29 paid by her in 
April/May 1984 on the past due mortgages. (See Statement of 
Facts, paragraph 11 above for trial court's language which may 
suggest the court's ruling on this point.) 
16. On May 10, 1984, Linderman, by stipulation with 
Walkers, obtained an order from the trial court moving the 
-7-
management of the six fourplexes from Walkers to her. The 
order also stated: 
2. That the above arrangement shall in no way 
release any claim or cause of action the parties 
now have or may have one against the other, it 
being the intent of the parties to reserve any 
and all rights the parties now have or shall 
have one against the other. 
(Record, pages 154-57). 
17. In May, 1984, Linderman retained RVA Service 
Corporation to take over management of the property. From May 
10, 1984 to December 15, 1984, the time Walkers were still to 
manage the six fourplexes pursuant to the contract, Linderman 
expended an additional $42,557.94 ($47,900 was spent, but 
$1,801.30 was for landscaping and is covered in paragraph 9 
above, and $3,540.76 was for drapes and is also not included 
in the claim for damages) of her own funds toward the 
management of the property (Transcript, page 272, lines 14-17; 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 13, 27 and 28). In addition, in calendar 
year 1985, Linderman paid an additional $7,984.98 to repair a 
latent defect which was readily apparent in May, 1984 which 
was not repaired earlier because of lack of funds (Transcript, 
page 181, lines 8-25; page 182; Plaintiff's Exhibit 13). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The essence of the argument in this case is that 
Walkers breached their contract with Linderman. The breach 
was substantial in that several areas of the parties' contract 
were not kept by Walkers. 
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At trial, Linderman claimed the following sums for the 
breach of Walkers: 
1. $41,000 plus interest from March 15, 1983, for 
Walkers1 failure to finance within 90 days. 
2. $2,400 for Walkers' failure to complete the 
property according to plans and specifications. 
3. $69,052.93 due to Walkers' failure to manage, 
"feed" and otherwise meet all of the expenses of the property 
for two years, and to maintain a reserve fund for the repairs 
of latent defects on the property. 
4. $21,300 representing treble damages due to Walkers' 
breach of their fiduciary duty to Linderman as provided by 
Section 61-2-1 et seq. Utah Code Ann. (1953 as in effect in 
1982). 
5. $7,500 plus in attorney fees as provided by the 
parties' contract in the event of breach. 
6. Punitive damages for Walkers' fraud, deceit and 
conversion of funds in the trust account maintained for the 
property by Walkers. 
The facts do not support the trial court's award of 
only $10,505 of the above claims. In addition, the trial 
court's findings on several of the claims herein are 
deficient, a determination leaving unclear why and how the 
court ruled the way it did. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
WALKERS BREACHED THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES BY NOT CLEARING WITHIN 90 DAYS THE LIEN 
OF CERTAIN CONSTRUCTION LOANS ON TWO OF THE 
FOURPLEX UNITS SOLD TO LINDERMAN. FOR THAT 
BREACH, LINDERMAN IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
$41,000 FROM WALKERS. 
The "Escrow Agreement" entered into by the parties 
provides in its paragraph 3 as follows: 
3) Seller agrees to refinance Units 984 and 988 
to clear the Logan Savings and Loan construction 
loans on Units 987 and 988 within 90 days of 
closing. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.) 
As set forth in the Stipulated Facts, paragraph 8: 
"The refinancing did not take place within the agreed 90 
days. Units 981 and 983, the units actually refinanced, were 
refinanced approximately 20 days beyond the 90 days agreed 
upon." 
The Escrow Agreement in its paragraph 4 stated what 
would happen if the refinancing did not take place within 90 
days: 
4) If refinancing is not obtained as agreed, 
seller shall deed to buyer: 
Unit 984 encumbered as indicated above. 
Unit 987 subject only to Logan Savings and Loan 
Trust Deed. 
Unit 988 subject only to Logan Savings and Loan 
Trust Deed. 
The Logan Savings and Loan trust deeds secured $70,000 
construction loans (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, numbered paragraph 
1). 
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At the end of the 90 days, when the refinancing was not 
in place, Peterson testified he sent a letter to the escrow 
agent, Cache Title Company, instructing Cache Title to 
proceed in accordance with the contract of the parties 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 36). 
Under the Escrow Agreement, paragraph 6, Cache Title 
was to use the $41,000 it had in escrow for the very purpose 
of insuring performance by Walkers. If the refinancing was 
not obtained within 90 days, Cache Title was to "clear the 
amount owing to Worthen (the builder of the fourplexes and 
seller to Walkers) over and above the balances of the 
construction loans ... ." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3; Escrow 
Agreement, paragraph 7.) The whole of paragraph 7 of the 
Escrow Agreement provides as follows: 
7) CACHE TITLE COMPANY is empowered to insert 
the necessary encumbrances as "subject to" 
provisions of the deeds when seller has 
performed or upon expiration of the 90 days, and 
to record the necessary documents held to 
accomplish the intent of this agreement. The 
balance of the down payments shall be used to 
clear the amount owing to Worthen over and above 
the balances on the construction loans at Logan 
Savings and Loan Association on Units 987 and 
988. Cache Title Company shall hold deeds to 
all units as above described. 
There was a great deal of testimony at trial about the 
intent and meaning of provisions set forth above. What the 
provisions intended and mean is simple: They intend and mean 
what they say. Accordingly, Linderman seeks relief in 
conformance with the agreement between the parties. If 
specific performance were available, Linderman would be 
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entitled to deeds to the two fourplexes encumbered only to the 
extent of $70,000 each. However, where the two fourplexes 
were eventually financed by Walkers at approximately $90,000 
each, Linderman is entitled to an award of the $41,000 in 
order that she realize the benefit of her bargain. 
Ralph Walker testified that he received a real estate 
broker's license in 1975 and has had numerous concerns in real 
estate (Transcript, page 333, lines 21-24). In addition, 
Mr. Walker testified that he has been in the real estate 
business since early 1973 as a general contractor and had been 
active "in real estate development primarily in sales" since 
1983 and "predominately on [his] own behalf." (Transcript, 
page 334, lines 2-12). 
John Peterson testified that the provision on the 
$41,000 was carefully drafted (Transcript, page 161, lines 
11-25; pages 162-74; pages 220-243). As his sister's 
attorney-in-fact, Peterson was seeking the best deal possible 
for Linderman (Transcript, page 234, lines 1-22). In response 
to the question of why paragraph 8 of the addendum 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) was stricken out, Peterson testified: 
What I wanted to make absolutely clear is that 
in the event of a failure to find an in-place 
permanent financing by the 90-day interval that 
we agreed upon, that the remainder of the escrow 
funds and the title deeds, subject only to the 
construction loan, would be delivered to me by 
Cache Title. 
(Transcript, page 220, lines 6-16). 
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The very documents compromising the contract between 
the parties support the finding of careful drafting. 
Paragraph 8 of the Addendum (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) is lined 
out and initialed by the parties under the statement: 
"Revised as per attached for 1-7." The whole of the Escrow 
Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) is a careful revision of the 
Addendum, paragraph 8 (Transcript, page 161, lines 11-25; 
pages 162-174; page 347, lines 11-25; pages 348-349). 
At trial, Ralph Walker admitted that it was Peterson 
who offered 90 days instead of the 60 days previously 
suggested in the Addendum, paragraph 8 (Transcript, page 347, 
lines 22-25; page 348, lines 1-7). Peterson testified he 
wanted the 90 days for Walkers to allow Walkers "sufficient 
latitude" to find the permanent refinancing. 
The $41,000 in issue was at the heart of the contract. 
The $41,000 was the subject of a substantial contingency. It 
was not a forfeiture or penalty. Walkers breached the 
argument, thereby failing to meet the contingency. 
Consequently, Linderman is entitled to the benefit of her 
bargain. 
Utah law is clear on this point: A fundamental concept 
of contract law is that once the parties have reduced 
conditions to a writing and agreed thereto, the writing is to 
be interpreted in accordance with ordinary usage, and the 
conditions may not be ignored or modified "because it may 
subject one of the parties to hardship, but they must be 
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enforced !in accordance with the intention as ... manifested 
by the language used by the parties to the contract ... .T" 
Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P.2d 221 
at 223 (1958). 
There is no uncertainty or ambiguity about the 
condition contained in paragraphs 3, 4 and 7 of the Escrow 
Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). Linderman, through her 
brother, Peterson, bargained with Walkers for a benefit. 
Walkers did not obtain refinancing of the construction loans 
within 90 days and so were obligated, in accordance with 
paragraph 4 of the Escrow Agreement, to deed to Linderman 
"Unit 984 encumbered as indicated above. Unit 987 subject 
only to Logan Savings and Loan Trust Deed. Unit 988 subject 
only to Logan Savings and Loan Trust Deed." 
The Utah Supreme Court further reiterated its position 
that "people should be entitled to contract on their own terms 
without the indulgence of paternalism by courts in the 
alleviation of one side or another from the effects of a bad 
bargain" in Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989, 
990 (1958). Carlson, supra, involved a real estate contract. 
The sellers under the contract resumed possession of the 
property sold the buyers, the sellers keeping payments made by 
the buyers over a two year period as liquidated damages as was 
expressly provided by the contract of the parties. In 
reversing the lower court's award of judgment to the buyer, 
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the Supreme Court cited Ephraim Theatre, supra, and the 
language of Mr. Justice Worthen: 
It is not our prerogative to step in and 
renegotiate the contract of the parties ... . 
There is no reason why we should consider the 
vended privileged ... unless the conditions 
... are unconscionable ... and ... we should 
recognize and honor the right of persons to 
contract freely and to make real and genuine 
mistake when the dealings are at arms1 length. 
332 P.2d at 991. 
Ralph Walker, as indicated in his own testimony, was a 
real estate broker with considerable experience in this 
community. He knew what he was doing in this transaction. 
The Escrow Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) was carefully 
negotiated by Peterson and Walkers and executed at arms' 
length. The entire contract, including the Escrow Agreement, 
should be enforced by this Court awarding Linderman the 
$41,000 plus interest claimed by her in the pleadings and at 
trial. 
The trial court denied Linderman the $41,000 on two 
bases: (1) Linderman "suffered no damages;" (2) Walkers' 
delay in financing was "occasioned at least in part by the 
notice of claim of contract recorded by Peterson and getting 
the same released of record." Neither basis can be supported 
by the record. 
Linderman was not required to immediately pay out funds 
as a result of Walkers' failure to finance timely, nor was she 
hurt until the $41,000 was paid out to Walkers (December 
1983). Once the money was paid out, Linderman had no way to 
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recoup her $41,000 benefit of the bargain short of obtaining a 
judgment against Walkers. Linderman did suffer damages—she 
didn't get the deal she bargained for. 
Peterson in no way held up Walkers1 refinancing of the 
property. Ralph Walker never asked Peterson to release the 
notice of contract until long after the 90-day period 
expired. Ralph Walker testified that it was only two or three 
days from the time of his request to Peterson that Peterson 
provided the release (Transcript, page 354, lines 3-25; page 
355, lines 1-24, particularly lines 20-24). Peterson's 
testimony was the same: Ralph Walker requested the release on 
April 5, 1983, and by April 7, 1983, three days later, the 
release was delivered (Transcript, page 175, lines 20-25; page 
176, lines 1-19; Plaintiff's Exhibit 40). The Release of 
Notice of Contract was recorded April 8, 1983 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 40). 
The trial court erred in failing to grant Linderman the 
benefit of her bargain by awarding the $41,000 claimed, plus 
interest from March 15, 1983, the time the financing was to be 
in place. 
II 
WALKERS FAILED TO COMPLETE CONSTRUCTION ON 
PROPERTY SOLD TO LINDERMAN BY WALKERS IN 
ACCORDANCE TO "PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS" AS WAS 
PROVIDED BY THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING LINDERMAN 
THE $2,400 CLAIMED AT TRIAL. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into by the 
parties, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, provides for sale by 
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Walkers to Linderman "six four-unit apartment buildings 
completed according to plans and specifications." 
By virtue of the stipulated facts, paragraph 11, 
Walkers were deemed to have admitted that the property was not 
completed according to "plans and specifications." 
Both Linderman and Peterson testified at trial that 
they were shown plans and specifications in the office of 
Ralph Walker just prior to purchase of the property in 
December, 1982 (Transcript, page 270, lines 22-25; page 271, 
lines 1-14; page 134, lines 23-25; pages 135-136; page 137, 
lines 1-9). Linderman and Peterson testified that the 
plans and specifications they saw included a map identical to 
or highly similar to that map attached to Plaintiff's Exhibit 
11. Linderman testified that she specifically was told by 
Walker that Walker had access through a nursery to the various 
plants and materials necessary to landscape the property 
(Transcript, page 271, lines 11-14). 
Peterson, Russell V. Anderson, president of RVA 
Service Corporation, the company hired by Linderman to 
manage the property from May 10, 1984 on, and also Ralph 
Walker testified that at the time Linderman took over 
management, there were large areas where no grass was ever 
planted, there were no shrubs, and most of the few trees 
planted were dead (Transcript, page 149, lines 7-23; page 45, 
lines 5-25; and Transcript, page 343, lines 6-25; page 344; 
page 345, lines 1-4). 
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Unrefuted testimony at trial showed $2,400 to be the 
cost to complete the landscaping, bringing the real property 
to full completion in accordance with the plans and 
specifications as required by the contract (Transcript, page 
158, lines 22-25; page 159-60; page 161, lines 1-10; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11; see also, Plaintiff's Exhibits 13, 27 
and 28 which show that Linderman paid $1,801.30 in calendar 
year 1984 and $618.37 in calendar year 1985). 
Without explanation, the trial court awarded only 
$1,000 of the $2,400 claimed for deficient landscaping, tree 
and grass planting. The trial court erred in not awarding 
Linderman the entire $2,400 claimed. 
Ill 
WALKERS BREACHED THE CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES 
BY NOT PLACING PRO-RATED RENTS IN THE SUM OF 
$2,709.68 AND SECURITY DEPOSITS OF $3,725 
INTO A "TRUST ACCOUNT (10TH AVENUE TOWNHOUSES)" 
NOR TO ANY OTHER ACCOUNT OF LINDERMAN1S. 
The Addendum to Uniform Real Estate Contract 
(hereinafter "Addendum") provided in its paragraph 6 that: 
6. Rent of $2,709.68 and Security Deposits of 
$3,725.00 will be transferred to a trust account 
(10th Avenue Townhouses) and be used to pay 
taxes, insurance, maintenance, mortgage payments 
and all other costs of ownership in behalf of 
Arleigh P. Linderman as provided for in the 
contract addendum. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2.) 
By virtue of the Stipulated Facts, paragraph 12, that 
the $2,709.68 and $3,725 was never transferred to a "trust 
account," was deemed admitted by Walkers. 
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With all due respect to the trial court, it is 
impossible to determine from the record what the ruling was 
with respect to this claim. Though no reference is made to 
this claim, perhaps the trial court lumped this claim with 
those set forth in the arguments to follow in its statement 
set forth in the Memorandum Decision 2.d. and in the same 
language in its Findings of Fact 7(d): 
d. the further claims of plaintiff for damages 
for alleged breach of the management contract by 
the defendant and the withdrawal of monies from 
the property rental account for purposes not 
connected with the property, and the defendant's 
counterclaim against the plaintiff for breach 
of the contract by typing up and withholding the 
$41,000.00 by plaintiff and interference with 
contracts, and for the deposit of defendant's 
personal funds into the property rental account 
result in a net credit to the plaintiff of 
$1,905.00 for a total judgment in favor of 
plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum 
of $9,505.00. 
Perhaps the trial court ruled that if Walkers got their 
$41,000, the money would have been paid in to LindermanTs 
account. The fact of the matter is that Walkers were paid the 
$41,000 and the rents pro-rated of $2,709.68 and security 
deposits of $3,725 still were not paid into LindermanTs 
account. 
Linderman claimed her damages for this breach in her 
claim for the $18,510.01, $42,557.94, $7,984.98, and $2,400 (a 
total of $71,452.93) which she had to pay out of her own 
pocket. If Walkers had paid in the $2,709.68 and $3,725 into 
the account as contracted, Linderman would have had to come up 
with that much less money. 
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The trial court erred in not specifically ruling on 
this claim in favor of Linderman. 
The trial court's failure to mention the admitted 
breach in its findings of fact is also reversible error. It 
should be noted here that there were three version of findings 
submitted to Judge Call (Record, pages 346-359). The third 
version was submitted after an informal hearing was held with 
Judge Call, Ralph Walker, and Larry Jones on May 1, 1986. The 
findings of fact later signed by Judge Call (Addendum, pages 
18-22) were decided on by him at the May 1, 1986 informal 
hearing. 
In what is now a long line of cases, this Court has 
ruled time and again that the findings must find "the basic 
facts which show why that ultimate conclusion is justified." 
Smith v. Smith, UAR , No. 20419 (Utah, September 30, 
1986). As further stated in Smith: 
There must be "a logical and legal basis for the 
ultimate conclusions." Milne Truck Lines 
v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373, 
1378 (Utah 1986). As we stated in Rucker 
v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979): 
The importance of complete, accurate 
and consistent findings of fact in a 
case tried by a judge is essential to 
the resolution of dispute under the 
proper rule of law. To that end the 
findings should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached. 
See also, Mountain States Legal Foundation 
v. Public Service Commission, 636 P.2d 1047, 
1058 (Utah 1981); Elwell v. Board of Education, 
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626 P.2d 460, 463-64 (Utah 1981) (Maughan, 
C. J., dissenting). 
The findings in this case are wholly inadequate on this point 
and on others as will be argued below. 
IV 
WALKERS BREACHED THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES BY NOT PAYING ANY AND ALL AMOUNTS 
REQUIRED FROM DECEMBER 10, 1982 TO DECEMBER 15, 
1984 FOR PAYMENTS UNDER THE CONTRACT, WHICH 
PROVIDED FOR PAYMENT BY WALKERS OF ALL TAXES, 
INSURANCE, UTILITIES, RESERVE FUND, COSTS OF 
CURRENT MAINTENANCE AND OTHER EXPENSES INCIDENT 
TO MANAGEMENT. 
Prior to taking the management from Walkers in May of 
1985, Linderman paid out of her own funds $18,510.01 to 
bring current the mortgages and taxes on the property which 
were in serious default. After taking over management on May 
10, 1984, Mrs. Linderman paid an additional $42,557.94 through 
December 15, 1984, for the items guaranteed by Walkers under 
the contract. In 1985, Mrs. Linderman also paid an additional 
$7,984.98 for repairs to the property necessary even before 
her taking management on May 10, 1984. At trial, Linderman 
claimed damages of $18,510.01, $42,557.94, and $7,984.98, or a 
total of $69,052.93 plus interest at the contract rate of 12 
percent from the time said sums were paid out by Linderman. 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Addendum, Plaintiff's Exhibit 
2, carefully set forth what is essentially a guarantee by 
Walkers to pay all costs relative to the property for two full 
years from the date of sale. Because of the length of these 
paragraphs, they are not set out in body of this brief, but 
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they are contained in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, a copy of 
which is attached to the Stipulated Facts in the Addendum. 
In paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Stipulated Facts, it was 
deemed to have been admitted by Walkers that Walkers did not 
pay all of the costs of the property for the 2-year period. 
Testimony at trial by Linderman and Peterson showed 
that prior to RVA Service Corporation's management of the 
property from May 10, 1984 on, Linderman paid $18,510.01 to 
bring current taxes and mortgage payments which Walkers let go 
seriously in default. Of that amount $6,860.40 was paid to 
United Savings and Loan and $7,921.89 to Worthens to bring 
current the mortgage payments, and $3,727.72 was paid for 
the past due 1983 taxes (Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 22, 23, 24, 
25 and 26). 
Peterson and Russell V. Anderson of RVA Service 
Corporation both testified that they saw the property in May, 
1984. They testified that weeds were waist high; four of the 
six sprinkler systems were not functioning; only two of the 
six units had grass; there was waste scattered about the lots; 
all trees were dead but two; paint was peeling in the trim 
areas; doors on the outside were weatherbeaten; units were 
dirty and carpets were soiled; some doors had holes in them; 
one refrigerator was missing; one apartment had water 
problems; and nine units were vacated (Transcript, page 178, 
lines 8-25; pages 179-184; page 185, lines 1-2; page 44, lines 
21-25; pages 45-46; page 47, lines 1-11). 
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Mr. Anderson testified of his considerable experience 
in the management of apartments of this kind in the 
community. He testified that based on community standards, 
the condition of these 1 to 2-year old fourplexes was very 
poor (Transcript, page 55, lines 4-25; page 56). He testified 
that based on community standards the vacancy of nine of 24 
units was not reasonable nor were the problems outlined above 
the result of reasonable wear and tear (Transcript, page 54, 
lines 24-25; page 55, lines 1-3; page 72, lines 17-25; page 
55, lines 4-25; page 56; page 73, lines 14-19). 
On May 10, 1984, management of the apartments was taken 
from Walkers pursuant to an order entered by this Court on 
said date. The order provided in part that the taking of the 
management "shall in no way release any claim or cause of 
action the parties now have or may have one against the other, 
it being the intent of the parties to reserve any and all 
rights the parties now have or shall have one against the 
other." 
On May 3, 1984, Linderman hired RVA Service Corporation 
to manage the property (Transcript, page 47, lines 12-18; page 
81, lines 15-22). 
Mr. Anderson testified that upon receipt of management, 
RVA Service Corporation began the process of repairing, 
refurbishing and landscaping the property (Transcript, page 
81, line 25; page 82, lines 1-2; page 101, lines 24-25; pages 
102-114; page 115, lines 1-14; page 119, lines 9-25; page 120; 
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page 121, lines 1-8; Plaintiff's Exhibits 13, 27 and 28). 
Mr. Anderson testified that the repairs were done in a timely 
manner (Transcript, page 124, lines 15-25). Mr. Anderson 
testified that though vacancies went even higher in the summer 
of 1984, the apartments were quickly filled by fall, 1984 
(Transcript, page 115, lines 15-25). 
Mr. Anderson testified that he collected rents for 
Linderman and put his best efforts into the leasing of the 
fourplexes (Transcript, page 48, lines 24-25; page 49, lines 
1-8). Mr. Anderson testified that the rents were not 
sufficient to pay for the repairs and maintenance on the 
fourplexes (Transcript, page 49, lines 9-13). Mr. Anderson 
testified that from May 10, 1984, through December 15, 1984 
(the date Walkers1 2-year guarantee was up) Linderman was 
required to expend $47,900 out of her own pocket in addition 
to rents collected. The $47,900 (less $1,801.30 for 
landscaping and $3,540.76 for drapes) was spent for repairing 
and refurbishing of the property as well as for payment of the 
mortgages, taxes and insurance and costs of maintenance and 
management of the property (Plaintiff's Exhibits 13, 27 and 
28). Of the $47,900 paid by Linderman in 1984, only $2,731.35 
was paid to RVA Service Corporation in management fees 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 28). Peterson testified that in 
1985, Linderman paid $7,984.98 for a major repair on the 
property (Transcript, page 181, lines 8-25; page 182; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 13). This major repair was to the parking 
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lot and was a defect readily apparent in the spring of 1984 
prior to RVA Service Corporation being hired (ibid). Peterson 
testified the repair was not done until 1985 because of the 
great need for funds for other repairs and refurbishing 
(Transcript, page 181, lines 9-16). Peterson testified that 
the parking lot problem necessitating the $7,984.98 repair was 
clearly a latent defect (ibid). 
Paragraph 4 of the Addendum provided that Walkers 
establish a reserve of $250 per month for the 2-year period 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, numbered paragraph 4). The reserve 
was to be used, among other things, "to the curing of latent 
defects, if any, found during the two year period." (Ibid.) 
Though there was no conflicting testimony on this point, the 
trial court made no mention of the $7,984.98 expended by 
Linderman, the repair of the latent defect, or paragraph 4 of 
the Addendum. The trial court erred in failing to award 
Linderman the $7,984.98 claimed at trial for repair of the 
latent defect. 
How the trial court found on Linderman's claim for 
the $18,510.01, $42,557.94 and $7,984.98 is at best 
unclear. The trial court did award $3,700 of the $18,510.01 
to Linderman for payment of the 1983 taxes (Memorandum 
Decision 3(c); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 7(c)). 
The trial court then applied Linderman's claims of breach of 
the management contract against Walkers' counterclaim and came 
up with a $1,905 credit to Linderman (ibid). 
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The findings on this point are deficient. The 
deficiency constitutes reversible error. Rather than restate 
the argument and cites, please refer to the last few 
paragraphs of Argument III above which by this reference are 
incorporated herein. 
The trial court gives credence to Walkers' counterclaim 
by seemingly ruling Linderman's "tying up and withholding the 
$41,000 by plaintiff and interference with contracts, and for 
the deposit of defendant's personal funds into the property 
rental account ... ." (Ibid.) This statement by the trial 
court ignores the fact that Walkers did get the $41,000 in 
December 1983 (Statement of Facts 7), that Walkers only 
deposited $2,543.33 of their own funds into the rental account 
(Stipualted Facts, numbered paragraph 16), and Walkers 
admitted that they expected in the beginning to "lose" up to 
$10,000 on the feed and management portion of the contract 
during the two years specified (Transcript, page 361, lines 
9-25; page 362, lines 1-9). 
The trial court should be reversed and Linderman 
awarded the whole of the $69,052.93 expended by her, not just 
the $3,700 awarded. 
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V 
WALKERS BREACHED THE CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES BY 
TAKING PERSONAL LOANS FROM THE "TRUST ACCOUNT" 
IN THE AMOUNT OF $7,100. 
For this, damages of $7,100 plus interest at the 
contract rate of 12 percent from the date taken were claimed 
at trial. 
The Stipulated Facts, paragraph 20, provides that 
"Walkers are deemed to have admitted that sums in excess of 
$7,000 were taken from the 10th Avenue Townhomes account for 
use by Walkers wholly unrelated to interests of Linderman and 
without authorization of any kind from Linderman." 
Copies of the checks representing the unauthorized 
taking and use of the funds were produced at trial 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 29, 30, 31 and 32). Three of the checks 
carried the description "loan" and one "loan to cover stock 
and Andrews so we don't spend all." An employee of one 
of Ralph Walker's companies, Dawn Draney, testified that all 
check were made payable to Walker and Walker Investments and 
were intended as loans to Walker and Walker Investments as 
indicated on the checks themselves (Transcript, page 505, 
lines 5-8). 
The term "trust account" is referred to in numbered 
paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of the Addendum (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
2). In two of those paragraphs, paragraphs 3 and 6, specific 
reference is made to payment of taxes from that trust 
account. The 1983 taxes, due November 30, 1983, were not paid 
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by Walkers presumably because there was no money in the trust 
account at the time they were due, approximately the same time 
the loans were taken. As stated above, Linderman herself paid 
the taxes on May 8, 1984, which, with penalties, totaled 
$3,727.72 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 26). 
In addition, as with the $2,709.68 prorated rents and 
$3,725 in security deposits, had the $7,100 remained in the 
trust account, that much less money would have had to be spent 
by Linderman in bringing the mortgages and taxes current, and 
in paying for repairs, maintenance, management, and 
landscaping. 
The trial court awarded Linderman "approximately $3,700 
of taxes agreed to be paid by him", which the trial court 
ruled "Defendant failed to pay." (Memorandum Decision 2; 
Findings of Fact 7(c).) Though it is not clear, the trial 
court seemingly ruled that had Walkers not taken the $7,100, 
the taxes would have been paid. The trial court did not go far 
enough. If Walkers had not taken the $7,100, not only could 
the approximately $3,700 of taxes have been paid, but another 
$3,400 of the expenses for the apartments could have been paid 
as well. 
The trial court erred in failing to award Linderman 
more than the $3,700 for taxes: the trial court should have 
also awrarded Linderman the rest of the $18,515.01 paid on past 
due mortgages, the $42,557.94 for repairs, maintenance and 
management, and the $7,984.98 for repair of the latent defect. 
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VI 
BY VIRTUE OF WALKERS' BREACHES AND FRAUD AND 
CONVERSION, MRS. LINDERMAN IS ENTITLED TO AN 
AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AS 
PROVIDED IN THE CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES. 
At trial, Linderman claimed her attorney fees and 
costs to be approximately $7,500 (Transcript, pages 278-283; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 33). The trial court awarded Linderman 
$1,000. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into by the 
parties provides in paragraph 21 "that the defaulting party 
shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing this 
agreement ... ." 
At trial, testimony was heard from Larry E. Jones, one 
of the counsel to Linderman and Peterson, as to the 
reasonableness of the fees charged Linderman, as set forth in 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 33 (Transcript, pages 278-283). 
Mr. Robert W. Gutke, an attorney who has practiced law for 
several years in Cache Valley, was also sworn and testified as 
to the general reasonableness of the sums set forth in 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 33 and also the reasonableness of the 
hourly charges of $75 for office time and $100 for trial time 
(Transcript, pages 283-288). 
At the last day of trial, October 9, 1985, a request 
was made of the court and granted that counsel for Linderman 
and Peterson be allowed to supplement Plaintiff's Exhibit 33 
with the attorney fees and costs incurred at trial and in the 
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preparing of post-trial memoranda if said fees and costs are 
awarded Linderman, as well as the attorney fees and costs 
incurred on this appeal (Transcript, page 540, lines 23-25; 
page 54L; page 542, lines 1-8)• 
The trial court erred in not awarding Linderman the 
whole of the $7,500 attorney fees requested, plus additional 
attorney fees incurred at trial, for preparation of the 
post-trial memorandum and other fees incurred subsequent to 
submission of Plaintiff's Exhibit 33. 
Further, Appellants' petition this Court for an award 
of attorney fees and costs reasonably incurred on their 
appeal. 
VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING LINDERMAN 
DAMAGES FOR WALKERS' VIOLATION OF THE UTAH 
UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT, AND WALKERS' FRAUD, 
DECEIT AND CONVERSION. 
At trial, Linderman claimed entitlement to judgment on 
the $7,100 amount set forth in Argument V above, not only by 
virtue of Walkers' breach of contract, but also pursuant to 
Walkers' violation of the Utah Uniform Securities Act Sections 
61-2-1 et seq. and fraud, deceit and conversion, which 
entitles Linderman to treble damages. By virtue of Walkers' 
violation of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and fraud, deceit 
and conversion, Linderman is also entitled to punitive 
damages. The treble damages claimed at trial were $21,300. 
The punitive damages claimed were $100,000. 
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A. Linderman is entitled to judgment on the $7,100 by 
virtue of Walkers' fraud, deceit, and conversion and violation 
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and to treble damages under 
the act. 
As testified to at trial by Ralph Walker, Mr. Walker 
was and has been a principal broker at all times relevant to 
this lawsuit. (See also, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9.) 
As a broker, Ralph Walker is subject to the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act. A portion of the definition of a 
principal broker set forth in the Utah Uniform Securities Act 
is one who "offers or attempts or agrees to collect rental for 
the use of real estate ... ." Section 61-2-2(1) Utah Code 
Ann. (1953 as in effect in 1982). 
Section 61-2-ll(b) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as in effect in 
1982) designates the act of "failing, within a reasonable 
time, to account for or to remit any moneys coming into his 
possession as a broker, which belong to others; misusing or 
commingling such funds with his own or with funds not held for 
others in the same capacity;" as a ground for revocation or 
suspension of a broker's license. Several other grounds are 
set forth in Section 61-2-11 which go to unworthiness and 
incompetence (subsection (8)) and dishonest dealing 
(subsection (16)). 
As set forth in Argument V above, the 10th Avenue 
Townhomes account was designated as "Trust Account" by the 
parties (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). 
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Russell V* Anderson, himself a principal broker for 
many years, testified that real estate practices in this 
community do not allow for use of a trust account belonging to 
another for personal "loans." (Transcript, page 74, lines 
10-25; pages 75-77; page 77, lines 1-3.) 
Utah law requires high standards of a real estate 
broker. As stated in Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 at 1248 
(Utah 1980): 
Under Utah law, the general rule is no fiduciary 
obligations exist between a buyer and seller of 
any property. A real estate agent, however, 
does not occupy the position of a lay vendor of 
property. An agent is licensed by the state and 
is required to meet standards of "honesty, 
integrity, truthfulness, reputation, and 
competency." A real estate license may be 
revoked if the licensee is unable or unworthy to 
safeguard the interests of the public. 
In this state, it is apparent that the rule of 
caveat emptor does not apply to those dealing 
with a licensed real estate agent. Though not 
occupying a fiduciary relationship with 
prospective purchasers, a real estate agent 
hired by the vendor is expected to be honest, 
ethical, and competent and is answerable at law 
for breaches of his or her statutory duty to the 
public. 
(footnotes omitted). 
In four check transactions, Walkers obtained "loans" 
from the 10th Avenue Townhomes account without the express or 
implied authorization of the trust account's actual owner, 
Linderman, or her attorney-in-fact, Peterson (Transcript, page 
271, lines 15-20; page 185, lines 22-25; page 186; page 187, 
lines 1-10). 
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Walkers' violation of their duty of honesty and fair 
dealing as set forth in the statutory and case law set forth 
above and as based on general principles of law relative to 
fraud, deceit and conversion entitles Linderman to a judgment 
of fraud, deceit and conversion of the $7,100 and entitles 
Linderman to treble damages as further damages as provided by 
Section 61-2-17 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as in effect in 1982). 
The trial court erred in not awarding the judgment and 
treble damages requested by Linderman at trial. 
B. Linderman is entitled to punitive damages by 
virtue of Walkers' fraud, deceit, and conversion and violation 
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
Where Linderman's claim is in tort as well as contract, 
punitive damages may be awarded. Leigh Furniture and Carpet 
Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). 
In Utah, punitive damages are available where a tort 
was committed. Punitive damages may be used to punish an 
offender to deter not only the offender, but also others 
similarly situated. 
The trial court erred in not awarding punitive damages 
to Linderman. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's award in this case should be: 
Reversed insofar as it did not award Linderman the $41,000 
plus interest from March 15, 1983, claimed for Walkers' 
failure to refinance in 90 days; reversed insofar as it did 
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not award Linderman the whole of the $2,400 claimed to 
complete the property in accordance with the "plans and 
specifications" (instead of the $1,000 awarded); reversed 
insofar as it did not award Linderman the whole of the 
$69,052.93 paid out by Linderman for past due taxes and 
mortgages, for maintenance, care and repair of the property up 
to December 15, 1984, and for repair of latent defects 
(instead of the $3,700 taxes awarded and $1,905 "credit" 
awarded); reversed insofar as it did not award Linderman the 
whole of her attorney fees and costs (instead of the $1,000 
awarded) and Linderman should be awarded reasonable attorney 
fees and costs on her appeal; reversed insofar as it did not 
award Linderman treble damages and punitive damages for 
Walkers taking $7,100 from the trust account. 
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of November, 1986. 
-YARD, LOW Jk-^NDERSON 
LARRY E.SjQ 
Attorney fc appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing APPELLANTS' BRIEF was mailed, postpaid, to 
the Respondents, Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M. Walker, at 942 
East Quail Place, Littleton, Colorado 8012^. :this 10th day of 
November, 1986. 
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A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
175 EAST FIRST NORTH 
L O G A N , U T A H 84321 
TELEPHONE (801) 752 -2610 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARLEIGH P. LINDERMAN, 
Plaintiff/ 
vs. 
RALPH L. WALKER and 
MARSHA M. WALKER, 
Defendants and Third-
Party Plaintiffs/ 
vs. 
JOHN A. PETERSON and 
CACHE TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation/ 
Third-Party Defendants. 
COME NOW Plaintiff Arleigh P. Linderman, Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M. Walker, and 
Third-Party Defendant John A. Peterson, and submit the following 
stipulated facts: 
1. On December 10, 1982, Plaintiff Arleigh P. Linderman 
(hereinafter "Linderman") as Buyer and Defendants and Third-Party 
Plaintiffs Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M. Walker (hereinafter 
"Walkers") as Sellers entered into a written agreement 
(hereinafter "contract") for the purchase and sale of six 
four-plexes. 
2. The contract consisted of (a) Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (2 pages) attached hereto as Plaintifffs Exhibit #1 and 
'
:!LED V -\ IQP5 
•
C
-"
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STIPULATED FACTS 
Civil No. 2lb30 
by this reference incorporated herein; (b) Addendum (2 pages) 
attached hereto as Plaintiff's Exhibit #2 and by this reference 
incorporated herein; (c) Escrow Agreement (1 page) attached 
hereto as Plaintiff's Exhibit #3 and by this reference 
incorporated herein; and (d) Exhibit "A" (descriptions and 
3 sketch, 3 pages) attached hereto as Plaintiff's ExniDit #4 and by 
X 
5 this reference incorporated herein, 
z 
o 3. At the time of the sale, the six four-plexes were 
o 
- i 
jE listed in the contract as being encumbered as follows: 
O 
z 
H 
<r 
Unit 980 $88,000.00 owing to "Worthen" 
£ Unit 981 $88,000.00 owing to "Worthen" 
(A 
< 
« Unit 983 $91,000.00 owing to ."Worthen" 
§ Unit 9b4 $8y,t>00.00 owing to "Worthen" 
c 
I Unit 987 $91,000.00 owing to "Worthen" with underlying 
< mortgage of $70,000.00 owing from Worthen to Logan 
Savings & Loan Association 
Unit 988 $89,500.00 owing to "Worthen" with underlying 
mortgage of $70,000.00 owing from Worthen to Logan 
5 Savings & Loan Association 
g Total owed $537,000.00. See paragraph 1, Escrow Agreement 
o 
o (Plaintiffs Exhibit #3), and page 3 of Plaintiff's Exhibit #4. 
< 
J
 In actuality, the six tour-piexes were encumbered as 
follows as shown on the records of Cache County, State of Utah: 
Unit 980 $91,000.00 to "Worthen" with underlying mortgage 
of $70,000.00 owing from Worthen to Logan Savings 
& Loan Association 
Unit 981 $89,500.00 to "Worthen" with underlying mortgage 
of $70,000.00 owing from Worthen to Logan Savings 
& Loan Association 
Unit 983 $89,500.00 to "Worthen" 
-2-
Unit 984 $91,000.00 to "Worthen" 
Unit 987 $88,000.00 to "Worthen" 
Unit 988 $88,000.00 to "Worthen" 
Total Owed $537,000.00 
4. The dpwn payment to be paid by Linderman to Walkers was 
2 $123,000.00. See paragraph 3, page 1, Uniform Real Estate 
5 Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit #1). 
z 
o 5. Two-thirds of the down payment was paid immediately to 
-j 
iE Walkers, and one-third ($41,000.00) was placed in escrow. See 
X 
O 
i- paragraphs 2, 6 and 7, Escrow Agreement, Plaintiff's Exhibit #3 
X 
t (page 5 of contract). 
< 
tai 
in 6. The Escrow Agreement provided that Walkers refinance 
o Units 984 and 988 and use the funds generated thereby to pay the 
U) 
X 
Id | construction loan portions of the obligations to "Worthen" on 
< 
* Units 987 and 988. See paragraph 3, Escrow Agreement, 
o 
d Plaintiffs Exhibit #3. 
x 
< 
j 7. The Escrow Agreement provided that the refinancing was 
i 
2 to take place within 90 days atter closing. See paragraph 3, 
o Escrow Agreement, Plaintiff's Exhibit #3. 
< 
J
 8. The refinancing did not take place within the agreed 90 
days. Units 981 and 983, the units actually refinanced, were 
refinanced approximately 20 days beyond the 90 days agreed upon. 
9. Units 981 and 983 were refinanced with mortgages of 
$90,950.00 each, or a total of $2,900.00 ($1,450.00 per unit) in 
excess of the amount Walkers were allowed to finance pursuant to 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract and provided in the Escrow 
-?-
Agreement. See Uniform Real Estate Contract, page 1, paragraph 
8, Plaintiff's Exhibit #1, and Escrow Agreement, paragraph 1, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #3. Also, deemed to have been admitted by 
Walkersf Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions No. 2. 
10. Lindprman admitted she suffered no damages by virtue of 
3 the delay in refinancing, but claims damages "for failure to pay 
i 
< 
D an agreed sum upon the occurrence of a contingency specified in 
z 
o the contract." .Linderman's Answers to Walkers' Requests for 
f Admissions No. 2. 
11. /^he six four-unit apartment buildings which were the 
H subject of the transaction between Walkers as sellers and 
«o Linderman as buyer more fully set forth in the Uniform Real 
o Estate Contract, Plaintiff's Exhibit #1, were not and are not yet 
§ completed according to plans and specifications. Deemed to have 
< 
^ been admitted by Walkers, Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions 
5 12. XRent of $2,709.68 and security deposits ot $3,725.00 A' 
2 were never transferred into a "trust account (10th Avenue o 
o Townhomes)" as provided in paragraph 6 of the Addendum, 
< 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #2. Deemed to have been admitted by Walkers, 
Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions No. 3. 
13. The copies of sales slips and receipts attached as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #5 and by this reference incorporated herein 
are true and correct copies of sales slips and receipts 
maintained by Walkers and/or their agents on behalf of 
-4-
Linderman. Deemed to have been admitted by Walkers, Plaintiffs 
Requests for Admissions Nos. 4 and. 5-^
 f /7 * / /^ /? x~/ , 
1 4 . / 4 1 ! amounts represented by the sales slips and receipts 
attached as Plaintifffs Exhibit #5 belonged solely to Linderman, 
Walkers acting, as agents in the receipt therefor and acting as 
S agents in the disposition thereof, all in accordance with the 
i 
< 
D Uniform Real Estate Contract, Addendum and Escrow Agreement, 
z 
§ Plaintiff's Exhibits #1, 2 and 3 respectively. Deemed to have 
J 
f been admitted by Walkers, Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions 
o 
z 
H No. 6. 
en 
H 15. The copies of deposit slips attached hereto as 
< 
Id 
jS Plaintiff's Exhibit #6 and by this reference incorporated herein 
o are true and correct copies of all deposit slips made by Walkers 
c 
UJ 
z and/or their agents deposited to the credit of 10th Avenue 
< 
^ Townhomes, Commercial Security Bank Account No. 250015743. 
o 
-J 
d Deemed to have been admitted by Walkers, Plaintiff's Requests for 
< 
> 
d Admissions Nos. 7 and 8. ~ A\w /9^f/ +— 
16. / |f 11/21/83 $400.00 deposit, a 12/12/83 $2b.00 deposit, ktU U £ 
o and a 5/8/84 $2,118.33 deposit to the 10th Avenue Townhomes 
< 
Commercial Security Bank account represents all the deposits to 
said account by Walkers ot funds not belonging to Linderman. 
Deemed to have been admitted by Walkers, Plaintiff's Requests for 
Admissions No. 9,. /
 f - , , />/JL~ 
1/.yf^he amounts set forth in paragraph 16 above and 
expenditures in the amount of $905.18 dated 1/3/83, $905.18 dated 
1/3/8J, $936.04 dated 1/3/83, and $936.04 dated 1/3/83 all 
-5-
represented by checks from the Walker Realty Group First 
Interstate Bank account with Logan Savings & Loan as payee 
cumulatively comprises the total sum of money expended by Walkers 
after December 10/ 1982/ in relation to the six four-plexes. 
Deemed to have been admitted by Walkers/ Plaintifffs Requests for 
3 Admissions No. 10. 
oo 
I 
5 18. The copies of checks attached hereto as Plaintiff's 
z 
5 Exhibit #7 and by this reference incorporated herein are true and 
o 
- i 
•jE correct copies of drafts on the 10th Avenue Townhouse Commercial 
K 
O 
* Security Bank Account No. 1/50015/43. Deemed to have been 
</> 
X 
£ admitted by Walkers/ Plaintiffs Requests for Admissions No. 11. 
< 
» 19. The copies of checks attached as Exhibit #7 represent 
§ all drafts on the 10th Avenue Townhouse Commercial Security Bank 
</) 
X 
S Account No. 750015743. Deemed to have loeen admitted by Walkers/ 
< 
* Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions .No,* 12^ . * <// />*-£/ ~A 
Q- 20. /^fums in excess of $7/000. 700 were taken from the 10th 
J Avenue Townhomes account for use by Walkers wholly unrelated to 
i 
S interests ot Linderman and without authorization of any kind from 
y 
o Linderman. Deemed to have been admitted by Walkers/ Plaintiffs 
< 
J
 Requests for Admissions No. 13. 
21. After application ot income from the six four-plexes 
owned by Linderman/ Walkers did not pay/ free of any claim by 
Walkers/ any and all amounts required from December 10/ 1982/ 
until May 10, 1984, to: 
(a) Pay monthly payments due Walkers from Linderman; 
(b) Pay taxes/ inmsurance and utilities on said six 
four-plexes. 
(c) At the rate of $250.00 per month/ establish a 
reserve for repairs to be disbursed as further provided in the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract/ Addendum and Escrow Agreement/ 
3 Plaintiff's Exhibits #1/ 2 and 3 respectively; 
i 
< 
D (d) Pay costs of current maintenance and other 
z 
§ expenses incident to the management of the property. 
- i 
£ Deemed to have been admitted by Walkers/ Plaintiff's 
o 
2 
H Requests for, Admissions No. 14. - ^ K_*_* f^J-/ ^u 
t 2z. Walkers did not pay any sum toward monthly payments due 
< 
hi 
£ Walkers from Linderman7 taxes/ insurance and utilities on said 
0 six four-plexes/ any reserve funds for repairs/ or for current 
tr 
DJ 
§ maintenance and other expenses incident to management of the 
< 
^ property of Linderman from May 10/ 1984/ through December 15/ 
o 
d 1984. Deemed to have been admitted by Walkers/ Plaintiff's 
< 
1 Requests for Admissions No. 15. 
i 
12 23. The document attached as Plaintiff's Exhibit #8 and by 
c 
o this reference incorporated herein is a true and correct copy of 
< 
a document prepared by Defendants and/or Defendant Ralph 
L. Walker. Deemed to have been admitted by Walkers/ Plaintiff's 
Requests tor Admissions No. 16. 
24. The document attached as Plaintiff's Exhibit #y and by 
this reference incorporated herein is a true and correct document 
prepared by Defendants and/or Defendant Ralph L. Walker/ 
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excepting the signature of "John A. Peterson, attorney in fact 
for Arleigh P. Linderman" appearing thereon. Deemed to have 
been admitted by Walkers, Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions 
No. 17. 
25. The document attached as Plaintiff's Exhibit #lu and by 
this reference incorporated herein was prepared by Defendants 
and/or Defendant Ralph L. Walker and is a true and correct copy 
of document prepared by Defendant and/or Defendant Ralph 
L. Walker. Deemed to have been admitted by Walkers, Plaintifffs 
Requests for Admissions No. 18. 
Dated this ft® — day of July, 198b. 
LARRY E. jeflES/ / 
Attorney for P/lai-ntiff Arleigh 
P. Linderman arfcf Third-Party 
Defendant John A. Peterson 
GftftTSgSPH-&R- L. DXTNES 
Attorney for Defendants Ralph 
L. Walker ana Marsha M. Walker 
"?^S\ 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this 1 0 t h day of December
 A# D # | 19J32_ 
>,yo^w^n Ralph L. Walker and Marsh- M. Walker 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and A r l e i q h P . ^ i n d e r m a n 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
the county of Cache , state of Utah, to-wit: 150 West 10th North 
ADDRESS 
More particularly described as follows: 
Six 4-unit apartment buildings completed according to 
plans and specifications. 
See Exhibit "A". 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of . 
Six Hundred S i x t y Thousand and no/100 nnii«r« ($660,000 ,00) 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order 
strictly within the following times, to-wit: One Hundred Twenty Three Thousand ^ 1 2 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ 5 3 / , 0 0 0 . 0 0 shall be paid as follows: 
$5,523.65 due January 10, 1983 and each and every month thereafter 
until balance is paid in full. At the end of 15th year Seller 
has the option as provided in Paragraph 5 to, upon proper notice, 
demand the underlying mortgages on units 9 30, 9 81, 9 83, 9 87, be 
paid in full. 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the 1 0 t h day of D e c e m b e r 1Q 8 2 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after D e c e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 8 2 
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or % 
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per 
month until paid. 
15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
~
x :i-t
- **"* «-*M-wv»o h*r»nf hv the Buver. or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
B. 
C. 
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contiact as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto n o a g r e e i u e n u S 
except the attached addendum 
17. 
18. 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors, and assigns'of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNES^ WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have/iereunto signed their names, the day and year 
first above written./ 
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PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
ADDENDUM TO UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
THIS ADDENDUM is made and entered into this 10 th day 
of December / 19 82 bY a n d between RALPH L. WALKER 
and MARSHA M. WALKER ("Sellers") and Arleigh P. Linderman 
("Buyer") and is hereby incorporated in and made a part of 
that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract between the parties 
of even date herewith (the "Contract"). 
1. It is understood and agreed that the property sold 
under the Contract includes six "four-plex" structures, 
each capable of being separately conveyed. 
2. Buyer, when not in default under the terms of the 
Contract, shall be entitled to prepay amount due on an 
individual building and have it released and conveyed to 
buyer. 
3. For a period of two years following the closing 
of the Contract, until December 15, 1984, Seller shall 
continue to manage the property on Buyer's behalf, including, 
but not limited to, collecting and accounting for rents, 
performing or contracting for necessary maintenance and repairs, 
snow removal, lawn care, and payment of taxes, insurance and 
utilities, etc. During such two year period all rental income 
shall be deposited in Trust Account with Logan Savings and 
Loan and applied as follows: First to the payment of the 
monthly payments due Seller from Buyer pursuant to paragraph 
3 of the Contract, taxes, insurance and utilities; Second, 
at the rate of $250.00 per month to a reserve for repairs to 
be accumulated and disbursed as provided in paragraph 4, below; 
Third to the payment of costs of current maintenance and other 
expenses incident to management of the property. In the event 
rental revenues in any month shall exceed the amounts required 
for such purposes, they shall be paid to Seller free of any 
claim of Buyer. In the event rental revenues in any month 
shall be insufficient for such purposes, Seller shall pay the 
difference and Buyer shall have no liability therefore. 
4. The reserve for repairs to be accumulated at the rate 
of $250.00 per month as provided in paragraph 3, above, shall 
be held in Trust Account and applied at the end of the two 
year period referred to therein, as necessary in the judgement 
of the Buyer, to the making of repairs to place the property 
in the condition in which it was on December 1983, reasonable 
wear and tear excepted, and to the curing of latent defects, 
if any, found during such two year period. The balance 
remaining after payment for such repairs and the curing of 
such latent defects shall be released to Seller. 
5. Seller shall have the option, on six months1 prior 
written notice given by registered or certified mail, return 
receipt requested, of requiring Buyer to pay entire contract 
balance, including principal and unpaid accrued interest, on 
December 15, 1997, excepting the two 4-plexes, 984 North 
150 West and 988 North 150 West, which the Buyer will not be 
requested to pay oft, but will have the full 30 years to pay 
off said underlying loans. 
6. Rent of $2,709.68 and Security Deposits of $3,725.00 
will be transferred to a trust account (10th Avenue Townhouses) 
and be used to pay taxes, insurance, maintenance, mortgage 
payments and all other costs of ownership in behalf of 
Arleigh P. Linderman as provided for in the contract addendum. 
7. As provided in paragraph 8 last sentence (When the 
principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer 
agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages.) Buyer may demand to 
have parcels deeded to him subject to underlying mortgages. 
8. It is understood that there exists the following 
underlying mortgage on the properties: 
C/Z^Vt fl* P*A-
9 8D 
981 
983 
984 
987 
88,000 
39,000 
9>>000 
89,5fr& 
91,000 
RLW 
RLW 
RLW 
RLW 
RfcW 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
Worthen 
Worthen 
Worthen 
Worthen 
Worthen i(Hk 
Sel le rs cigree to obtain long term loans >^s 
) 
988 89,500 
and construction loan 
Logan Sayings and Loan, 70,000 + 
RLW to Wbssthen and construction loan 
Logan Savings and Loan, 70,000 + 
to 
to 
1^ -
i ^ e n e i a -co o n on erm o  o« unit 9 84 and 9 88 and 
j ^ ^fec* pay off from the proceeds of the loans the crt^ns truction loan 
I a of Worthen's to Logan Savings and Loan. This mosLt be done within 
60 days of date of this contract. Buyers may assume these long 
term loans. Sellers to notify by certified mail to Ca^ &kg Mortgage 
fa Company to disperse funds on unit 9 84 only after satisfying 
^^t/iu^w underlying mortgage to Logan Savings on unit 9 87. The underling 
mortgage on 9 88 will automatically be paid off with long term 
loan tp clear title for new loan. 
r 
9. Buyer may prepay any amount or amounts due Seller under 
the Contract at any time without penalty. 
10. If there be any conflict between the Contract and 
this Addendum, this Addendum shall prevail. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned have executed this 
Addendum the day and year first above written. 
Sellerv Buy eft: 
ESCROW AGREEMENT s 
z 
it 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
1) It is understood and agreed that the units are encumbered as 
follows: 
Unit 980 $88,000.00 Trust Deed to Worthen 
Unit 981 $88,000.00 Trust Deed to Worthen 
Unit 983 $91,000.00 Trust Deed to Worthen 
Unit 984 $89,500.00 Trust Deed to Worthen 
Unit 987 $91,000.00 Trust Deed to Worthen $70,000.00 Trust Deed to LS&LA 
Unit 988 $89,500.00 Trust Deed to Worthen $70,000.00 Trust Deed to LS&LA 
2) Seller agrees to deed to Buyer in exchange for release of 2/3 of the 
down payment, Unit No.'s 980, 981 and 983, subject to the above indicated 
encumbrances. 
3) Seller agrees to refinance Units 984 and 988 to clear the Logan Savings 
and Loan construction loans on Units 987 and 988 within 90 days of closing. 
4) If refinancing is not obtained as agreed, Seller shall deed to buyer: 
Unit 984 encumbered as indicated above. 
Unit 987 subject only to Logan Savings and Loan Trust Deed 
Unit 988 subject only to Logan Savings and Loan Trust Deed 
5) If seller performs as agreed he shall deed: 
Unit 984 subject only to long term loans, loan totally $89,500.00 
Unit 987 subject only to Worthen Trust Deed 
Unit 988 subject only to long term loans, loan totally $89,500.00 
6) In order to assume preformance by both parties the following shall be 
placed in escrow: 
A) 1/3 of dov/n payment 
B) Warranty Deed for Unit 984 
C) Warranty Deed for Unit 9'87 
D) Warranty Deed for Unit 988 
7) CACHE TITLE COMPANY is empowered to insert the necessary encumbrances 
as "subject to" provisions of the deeds when seller has performed or upon 
expiration of the 90 days, and to record the necessary documents held 
to accomplish the intent of this agreement. The balance of the down 
payments shall be used to clear the amount owing to Worthen over and 
above the balances on the construction loans at Logan Savings and Loan 
Association on Units 987 and 988. Cache Title Company shall hold deeds 
to all units as above described. 
nJ9uL V Lt^*"*^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARLEIGH P. LINDERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RALPH L. WALKER and 
MARSHA M. WALKER, 
Defendants and Third-
Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN A. PETERSON and 
CACHE TITLE COMPANY, A 
Utah Corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Trial in the above matter was held on July 31st and August 1st of 
1985 and concluded on October 9, 1985 and the matter taken under 
advisement by the court with time allowed for briefs by each party. 
Without detailing the evidence other than to point out the evidence 
conflicted on most critical issues, the court concludes as follows: 
1. The issue at the base of the entire law suit and dispute 
between the parties was the claim by the plaintiff's brother and 
agent, Peterson, to $41,000.00 of the down payment as a forfeiture 
^because the long term financing took approximately 110 days instead 
Hof( 90 days. The real party in interest, the plaintiff, acknowledged 
-.that she suffered no damage by reason of such delay and further there 
re was testimony that the delay was occasioned at least in part by 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 21630 
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the notice of claim of contract recorded by Peterson and getting the 
same released of record. Accordingly the court concludes that the 
said $41,000.00 was the property of the defendant Walker and should 
have been paid by the escrow agent to Walker or for the reduction of his 
obligations owing on the subject real property. Further, many of the 
damages claimed by plaintiff were occasioned by the withholding of 
said $41,000.00 from the defendant. 
2. The evidence failed to establish any grounds for punitive 
damages against the defendant Walker. He was acting as seller of his 
own property rather than in a representative capacity. 
3. The court finds from the stipulation of the parties and the 
evidence presented at the trial that the dwelling units in question 
were properly completed, well constructed and of good design as 
acknowledged by Peterson's inspection and report of the properties 
prior to purchase, except for: 
a. the completion of the landscaping, tree and grass 
planting, which the court concludes were deficient at a value of 
$1,000.00; 
b. defendant further failed to obtain long term financing 
in the required amount, being deficient in the stipulated amount of 
$2,900.00; 
c. defendant failed to pay approximately $3,700.00 of taxes 
agreed to be paid by him; 
d. the further claims of plaintiff for damages for alleged 
A- 15 1/\f\ 
-3-
breach of the management contract by the defendant and the withdrawal 
of monies from the property rental account for purposes not connected 
with the property/ and the defendant's counterclaim against the 
plaintiff for breach of the contract by tying up and withholding the 
$41,000.00 by plaintiff and interference with contracts, and for the 
deposit of defendant's personal funds into the property rental account 
result in a net credit to the plaintiff of $1,905.00 for a total 
judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum 
of $9,505.00. 
The court notes in this connection that the plaintiff could have 
minimized his damages and perhaps avoided any loss at all, early in 
the proceedings by accepting defendant's offer to rescind the contract 
and receive back all payments. But plaintiff (Peterson) concluding she 
was entitled to the $41,000.00 as a forfeiture persisted in assertions 
to the apparent damage of both parties. 
Plaintiff to further have judgment against defendant for $1,000.00 
of attorney's fees together with costs and to prepare the appropriate 
findings, conclusions and judgment. 
Dated this J?/o< day of January, 19 86. 
BY THE^COUI^T: 
/ ( 
^ 
/ 
[jDM&tf'j. CALL-DI~StfRreT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g Memorandum D e c i s i o n ma i l ed t h i s v m 
-4-
day of feb<ru c\r^ , 1986, to Gordon J. Low, Hillyard, Low & Anderson, 
175 East First North, Logan, Utah 84321, and Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se, 
1355 Lakeview Drive, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
Seth S. Allen 
Cache County Clerk 
By -X Tgq^.A^CQ 
Deputy 
r> f c% 
-'.'ill 3*2 
H. .YARD, LOW & ANDERSON 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
175 EAST FIRST NORTH 
L O G A N , U T A H 84321 
TELEPHONE (801) 752-2610 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARLEIGH P. LINDERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RALPH L. WALKER and 
MARSHA M. WALKER, 
Defendants and Third-
Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN A. PETERSON and 
CACHE TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 21630 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on July 31 and August 1, 1985, and concluded on October 9, 
1985, before.the above-entitled Court. The Honorable Omer J. 
Call, District Judge, presided. Plaintiff Arleigh P. 
Linderman and Third-Party Defendant John A. Peterson appeared 
in person and by and through their attorneys, Gordon J. Low 
and Larry E. Jones of Hillyard, Low & Anderson. Defendants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M. 
Walker appeared in person and by and through their attorney, 
Christopher L. Daines of Daines & Plowman. Now being fully 
advised in the premises and for good cause shown, the Court 
makes the following: 
f: > r« 
Number 
FILED MAY 7 1386 
SETHS. ALLEN, Cferk 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That all events complained of occurred in Cache 
County, Utah. 
2. By the terms of the uniform real estate contract 
dated December 10, 1982, and addendum thereto of the same 
date, and a further attachment thereto dated December 15, 1982 
S (hereinafter "Contract") between Defendants and Third-Party 
i 
< 
5 Plaintiffs Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M. Walker (hereinafter 
z 
§ "Defendants Walker") as sellers and Plaintiff Arleigh P. 
iE Linderman (hereinafter "Plaintiff Linderman" ) as buyer, 
X 
0 H Defendants Walker sold to Plaintiff Linderman certain real 
0) 
K 
t property located in Cache County, State of Utah, comprising of 
< 
in six buildings of fourplex apartment dwellings. 
o 3. Defendants Walker did not within 90 days of closing 
111 | of the contract obtain long-term financing on the units and 
< 
5; thereby clear the short-term lien of certain construction 
o 
J gloans in favor of Logan Savings & Loan Association. 
< 
> 
J 4. That the long-term financing required by the 
§ contract to be obtained by Defendants Walker within 90 days, 
°was not actually obtained until 110 days instead of 90 days. 
< 
5. The issue at the base of the entire lawsuit and 
dispute between the parties was the claim by the Plaintiff!s 
brother and agent, Peterson, to $41,000.00 of the down payment 
as a forfeiture because the long-term financing took 
approximately 110 days instead of 90 days. The real party in 
interest, the Plaintiff, acknowledged that she suffered no 
- 2 -
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damage by reason of such delay and further there was testimony 
that the delay was occasioned at least in part by the notice 
of claim of contract recorded by Peterson and getting the same 
released of record. Accordingly the Court concludes that the 
said $41,000.00 was the property of the Defendant Walker and 
should have been paid by the escrow agent to Walker or for the 
3 reduction of his obligations owing on the subject real 
i 
< 
3 property. Further, many of the damages claimed by Plaintiff 
z 
S were occasioned by the withholding of said $41,000.00 from the 
jE Defendant. 
cr 
o 
H 6. The evidence failed to establish any grounds for 
t punitive damages against the Defendant Walker. He was acting 
< 
UJ 
in as seller of his own property rather than in a representative 
o capacity. 
a 
ui | 7. The Court finds from the stipulation of the parties 
< 
^ and the evidence presented at the trial that the dwelling 
o 
gunits in question were properly completed, well constructed 
< 
>• 
jand of good design as acknowledged by Petersonfs inspection 
i 
g and report of the properties prior to purchase, except for: 
° (a) the completion of the landscaping, tree and 
grass planting, which the Court concludes were deficient at a 
value of $1,000.00; 
(b) Defendant further failed to obtain long term 
financing in the required amount, being deficient in the 
stipulated amount of $2,900.00; 
A _ 2 0 600,\ fiii ^ 1 '1 
(c) Defendant failed to pay approximately 
$3,700.00 of taxes agreed to be paid by him; 
(d) the further claims of Plaintiff for damages 
for alleged breach of the management contract by the Defendant 
and the withdrawal of monies from the property rental account 
for purposes not connected with the property, and the 
S Defendant's counterclaim against the Plaintiff for breach of 
X 
< 
S the contract by tying up and withholding the $41,000,00 by 
2 
< 
§ Plaintiff and interference with contracts, and for the deposit 
of Defendant's personal funds into the property rental account 
H result: in a net credit to the Plaintiff of $1,905.00, for a 
H total judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendant 
gin the sum of $9,505.00. 
o 8. The Court notes in this connection tfrat the 
<n 
cr 
Ui 
§ Plaintiff could have minimized his damages and perhaps avoided 
< 
^ any loss at all, early in the proceedings, by accepting 
o 
gDefendant's offer to rescind the contract and receive back all 
< 
> 
dpayments. But Plaintiff (Peterson), concluding she was 
gentitled to the $41,000.00 as a forfeiture, persisted in 
° assertions to the apparent damage of both parties. 
< 
9. The contract between Plaintiff Linderman and 
Defendants Walker provided for attorney fees and costs in the 
case of a default. 
10. Plaintiff Linderman to have judgment against 
Defendants Walker for $1,000.00 of attorney fees, together 
with costs. 
-4-
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Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
now enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
That Plaintiff Linderman be awarded judgment against 
Defendants Walker for the sum of $10,505.00, together with 
costs. 
Dated this If day of £ / r\ 1986. 
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H CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
< 
in I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
l foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand-
§ delivered to Defendant Ralph Walker, pro se, this 
sMay, 1986. 
day of 
o 
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H. fARD, LOW & ANDERSON 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
175 EAST FIRST NORTH 
L O G A N , UTAH 8 4 3 2 1 
TELEPHONE (801) 7 5 2 - 2 6 1 0 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARLEIGH P. LINDERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RALPH L. WALKER and 
MARSHA M. WALKER, 
Defendants and Third-
Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN A. PETERSON and 
CACHE TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on July 31 and August 1, 1985, and concluded on October 9, 
1985, before*the above-entitled Court. The Honorable Omer J. 
Call, District Judge, presided. Plaintiff Arleigh P. 
Linderman and Third-Party Defendant John A. Peterson appeared 
in person and by and through their attorneys, Gordon J. Low 
and Larry E. Jones of Hillyard, Low & Anderson. Defendants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M. 
Walker appeared in person and by and through their attorney, 
Christopher L. Daines of Daines & Plowman. Now being fully 
advised in the premises, having heretofore entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and for good cause 
dumber r O A 6<X ; 1/ 
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JUDGMENT 
C i v i l No. 2 1 6 3 0 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Plaintiff Linderman be and is hereby awarded judgment against 
Defendants Walker for the sum of $10,505.00, together with 
COStS, fly . 
Dated this Q? day of rlI / 1986. 
BY 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing JUDGMENT was mailed, postpaid, to Defendant Ralph 
Walker, pro se, at 1355 Lakeview Drive, Bountiful, Utah 84010, 
this t ^ day of (}p\/£ 1986, 
Secretary rT 
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